TY - JOUR TI - Spatial competition with interacting agents AU - Ottino-Loffler, Bertrand AU - Stonedahl, Forrest AU - Veetil, Vipin AU - Wilensky, Uri VL - 10 IS - 3 PY - 2017 DA - 2017/12/31 SP - 75-91 C1 - IJM 2017;10(3):75-91 DO - 10.34196/ijm.00166 UR - https://doi.org/10.34196/ijm.00166 AB - Using agent-based modeling, we generalize Hotelling’s model of spatial competition with more than two firms in a two-dimensional space. Firms choose both price and location to maximize profits. The principle of minimum differentiation does not hold in general. Local duopolies emerge from the interaction between firms. Firms do not spread uniformly across the two-dimensional space, nor do they all charge the same price. Firms in more competitive locations charge lower prices and generate less profit. KW - hotelling KW - price competition KW - agent-based modeling KW - D21 KW - D43 KW - D83 JF - IJM SN - 1747-5864 PB - International Journal of Microsimulation ER -