Pensions and retirement

Research articles · Dec 31, 2012

Accrued pension rights in Belgium: Micro-simulation of reforms

Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman, Fabio Sigismondi, Ekaterina Tarantchenko

Université de Liège, Belgium; Center of Research in Public Economics and Population Economics (CREPP), Université de Liège, Belgium

Volume 5(2) Autumn 2012

Cite as: A. Jousten, S. Perelman, F. Sigismondi, E. Tarantchenko; 2012; Accrued pension rights in Belgium: Micro-simulation of reforms; International Journal of Microsimulation; 5(2); 22–39. doi: 10.34196/ijm.00070

Abstract

We simulate different reform scenarios of the Belgian pension system using a microsimulation approach. Using a rich administrative dataset with extensive information on individual earnings histories, we evaluate the impact of the scenarios for the individuals as well as the system as a whole. Our main metric for these analysis is the notion of accrued to date pension rights, i.e. the pensions rights that would be due if the system were shut down today and all accrued rights under current legislation were honoured. Our analysis illustrates that partial reforms have limited effects, both in distributional and in fiscal terms. To achieve more substantial effects, a more comprehensive approach is needed. Regional differences within the country are mostly due to differences in regional GDP rather than the pension system itself.

This article contains 13 figures and 4 tables.

Figures

Figure 1. Average ATD pension by age cohort – sample (2001 EUR).
Figure 2. Average ATD pension by status: baseline scenario – sample (2001 EUR).
Figure 3a. Population structure – Men ages 55–64 (2001).
Figure 3b. Population structure – Women ages 55–64 (2001).
Figure 4. Average ATD pension by age cohort (ATD>0) – sample (2001 EUR).
Figure 5a. Average ATD pension rights: Men ages 45–64 – sample (2001 EUR).
Figure 5b. Average ATD pension rights: Women ages 45–64 – sample (2001 EUR).
Figure 6a. Distribution of individuals according to the ATD pension rights, Baseline deciles – Population Belgium 2001.
Figure 6b. Distribution of individuals according to the ATD pension rights, Baseline deciles – Population Flanders 2001.
Figure 7. Average ATD pension rights by region – sample (45–64 years old – 2001 EUR).
Figure 8. Present discounted value of pension rights as % of national GDP – Belgium, 2001 (black – non pensioners, grey – current pensioners).
Figure 9. Present discounted value of pension rights as % of national GDP (18–64 years old, pensioners excluded) – Regional decomposition, 2001.
Figure 10. Present discounted value of pension rights as % of regional GDP(18–64 years old, pensioners excluded) – Regional decomposition, 2001.

Tables

Table 1. Population aged 18–64, excluding pensioners and dependent children (in %) Belgium (1/1/2002).
Gender and labor market situation Age Total
18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
Gender
 Men 52.8 50.4 50.5 50.3 51.3 50.3
 Women 47.2 49.6 49.5 49.7 48.7 49.7
Labor market situation
 Wage earners 78.6 60.6 50.9 37.8 16.8 46.9
 Self-employed 4.2 8.8 11.9 11.3 11.5 10.4
 Civil servants 2.0 5.2 11.7 16.0 9.6 10.1
 Sick / Disabled 1.1 1.1 2.2 4.5 6.9 3.1
 Unemployed / Pre-retired 14.1 9.5 7.5 9.8 23.6 11.6
 Others 0.0 14.7 15.8 20.6 31.5 17.9
Population (×1000) % of total population 439.0 1,392.9 1,580 1,399.5 881.0 5,692.5
7.7 24.5 27.8 24.6 15.5 100.0

Note: sample weights used.

Table 2. Key characteristics of reforms.
Reform 1 No spousal benefits Elimination of the more generous “married couple” replacement rates
Reform 2 No minima Elimination of minimum pensions and of minimum earnings by year of work
Reform 3 No imputed earnings Imputed wages for periods of inactivity valued at 0 (assimilated days)
Reform 4 Interaction effects Reforms 2 and 3 together
Reform 5 Career length Elimination of minimum earnings by year. No imputed earnings. Pension benefits computed on the best 35 years of career. Full career: 35 years.
Table 3. Distribution of gains and losses of annual ATD pensions: Ages 45–64 – sample (2001 EUR).
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4 Reform 5
% of losers 11.9 28.0 65.2 70.3 24.9
% of neutrals 88.1 71.5 32.4 27.4 13.8
% of winners 0.0 0.5 2.4 2.2 61.3
mean loss (k EUR) −1,620 −573 −665 −1,406 −1,348
mean gain (k EUR) 0 587 271 505 992
biggest loss (k EUR) −4,386 −6,620 −8,538 −13,727 −10,472
biggest gain(k EUR) 0 2,478 2,078 2,903 7,956
Gini coefficients Baseline = 0.441
0.439 0.454 0.453 0.502 0.465
Table 4. Distribution of gains and losses of annual ATD pensions by sex: Ages 45–64 – sample (2001 EUR).
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4 Reform 5
Men
% of losers 22.1 23.7 67.8 71.7 22.2
% of neutrals 77.9 75.4 28.0 24.0 11.9
% of winners 0.0 0.9 4.3 4.3 66.0
mean loss (k EUR) −1,658 −458 −853 −1,499 −1,368
mean gain (k EUR) 0 587 289 506 992
Women
% of losers 0.9 32.6 62.6 68.9 27.8
% of neutrals 99.1 67.4 37.1 31.1 15.8
% of winners 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.01 56.4
mean loss (k EUR) −658 −662 −448 −1,302 −1,330
mean gain (k EUR) 0 0 24 55 1,330