Taxes and benefits

Research articles · Apr 30, 2013

Improving work incentives in Serbia: Evaluation of a tax policy reform using SRMOD

Saša Ranđelović, Jelena Žarković Rakić

Faculty of Economics University of Belgrade, Foundation for the Advancement of Economics, Serbia

Volume 6(1) Spring 2013

Cite as: S. Ranđelović, J. Rakić; 2013; Improving work incentives in Serbia: Evaluation of a tax policy reform using SRMOD; International Journal of Microsimulation; 6(1); 157–176. doi: 10.34196/ijm.00080

Abstract

Inactivity and unemployment rates as well as informal employment rates in Serbia are particularly high among low-paid workers. Several studies argued that one of main reasons for high entry costs in the labour market in Serbia is the existence of the mandatory minimum base for social security contributions (SSC). Our paper is the first one to provide empirical evidence about the incentive and distributional effects of the abolishment of the mandatory minimum SSC base. Using the tax and benefit micro-simulation model for Serbia (SRMOD), which is based on EUROMOD platform, we found that this policy reform would reduce effective average tax rates by more than it would reduce effective marginal tax rate. This implies a larger participation response than hours-of-work response. A decrease in both of these indicators is most pronounced for lower income groups. At the same time, the reform would trigger positive distributional effects since the number of individuals in low-income groups, whose disposable income would increase after the reform by more than 2%, is ranging from 3.3% to 5.8%. However, the impact of the reform on the overall level of inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, would be small.

This article contains 2 figures and 7 tables.

Figures

Figure 1. Progressivity of the labour taxation system.
Figure 2. Mean EMTRs and EATRs by deciles, before and after the reform.

Tables

Table 1. Inactivity and unemployment rates by education and gender (%).
Level of education Inactivity rate Unemployment rate
Men Women Men Women
Primary 32.4 64.4 21.5 25.1
Secondary 24.5 40.9 22.4 26.5
Tertiary 18.0 22.4 15.5 14.2

Source: Labour Force Survey, 2011, age: 25–64.

Table 2. Proportion of unemployed and inactive without work experience by education and gender (%).
Level of education Unemployed Inactive
Men Women Men Women
Primary 35.1 42.3 14.9 55.0
Secondary 18.8 26.0 12.3 22.0
Tertiary 30.0 38.2 6.3 14.7

Source: Labour Force Survey, 2011, age: 25–64.

Table 3. Comparison of tax wedge in Western Balkan countries and EU.
Earnings as a % of the average wage 50% 67% 100% 167%
Country year
Serbia 2006 42.3% 42.3% 42.3% 42.3%
2007 37.6% 38.4% 39.2% 39.7%
Albania 2006 34.1% 27.9% 28.9% 29.8%
Montenegro 2007 36.3% 38.6% 40.9% 42.8%
BiH Federation 2006 30.6% 29.3% 32.3% 35.3%
R. of Srpska 2007 31.7% 31.6% 32.5% 33.2%
Macedonia 2007 41.2% 37.8% 38.6% 39.2%
EU-27 2008 37% 40.6% 45.1%
EU-15 2008 38.1% 42.4% 47.6%
NMS-12 2008 35.6% 38.5% 42%

Note: Tax wedge for a single person as a percent of total labour costs.

Source: Data for Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia (Leibfritz, 2008).

Other data: from Eurostat

Table 4. SRMOD macro-validation results: income tax and social contributions.
Administrative records SRMOD Ratio (SRMOD/Administrative data)
Average wage (in RSD) 37,668 34,659 0.92
Personal income tax 8,284,791 6,649,044 0.80
• salary/wage tax 6,966,756 5,693,117 0.82
Social security contributions - on full time employment income and unemployment
benefits 20,901,550 19,944,627 0.95

Source: Own calculations using SRMOD.

Table 5. SRMOD macro-validation results: benefits.
SRMOD Administrative records Ratio (SRMOD/Administrative records)
Recipients (HHs)
Monetary social assistance 53,444 50,848 1.05
Child allowance 229,221 199,323 1.15
Expenditures (in RSD)
Monetary social assistance 274,347,719 253,897,376 1.08
Child allowance 667,811,936 580,706,031 1.15

Source: Own calculations using SRMOD.

Table 6. Gini coefficient, before and after tax and benefit policy in Serbia.
Baseline Reform scenario
Gini coefficient - original income 44.75 44.75
Gini coefficient - disposable income 38.63 38.59

Source: own calculation using SMROD.

Table 7. Number of gainers from the reform per deciles.
% of individuals whose disposable income, after the reform, is increased by
Deciles More than 2% More than 5%
1 3.1 1.3
2 5.8 2.9
3 4.0 2.7
4 3.3 2.2
5 2.5 1.4
6 1.5 0.7
7 1.3 0.5
8 1.1 0.7
9 1.3 0.8
10 0.2 0.2

Source: own calculation using SMROD.