This article contains 2 tables.
Tables
| singles | couples | |
|---|---|---|
| relative risk aversion, γ | 1.55 | 1.55 |
| intratemporal elasticity, ε | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| utility price of leisure, α | 2.2 | 1.034 |
| d1scount factor, δ | 0.97 | 0.93 |
| bequest mot1ve, ζ | 30000 | 10000 |
| factor effects of pens1on take-up | ||
| at age 55 | 1 | 1 |
| from age 65 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| rents | lower | upper |
| shared | 63.89 | 63.89 |
| 1 bedroom (from spa) | 55.00 | 100.00 |
| 1 bedroom (pre spa) | 101.48 | 106.82 |
| 2 bedrooms | 69.25 | 132.54 |
| 3 bedrooms | 81.82 | 156.59 |
| 4 bedrooms | 107.12 | 205.01 |
Note: ‘spa’ refers to rents from ‘state pens1on age’.
| high alpha | no retirement effects | low delta | no bequest | low epsilon | high gamma | high rents | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | |
| proportions of population not employed | ||||||||||||||
| age 18–29 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.000 | −0.001 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.005 | −0.003 | 0.001 | 0.001 | −0.002 | 0.000 | −0.001 |
| age 30–54 | 0.018 | 0.037 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.037 | 0.076 | 0.090 | 0.096 | −0.015 | −0.006 | 0.035 | −0.004 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| age 55–74 | 0.024 | 0.028 | −0.098 | −0.117 | 0.004 | 0.026 | 0.159 | 0.141 | −0.038 | −0.023 | 0.052 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| geometric mean consumption (£2011 per week) | ||||||||||||||
| age 18–29 | −2.871 | −7.022 | 0.228 | 0.741 | 10.279 | 36.642 | 4.593 | 15.421 | −4.252 | −2.864 | 9.681 | 8.327 | 8.155 | 11.605 |
| age 30–54 | −2.754 | −12.967 | 1.248 | 8.072 | 13.229 | 68.993 | 25.536 | 92.553 | −9.079 | −34.765 | 19.582 | 21.433 | 30.011 | 14.241 |
| age 55–74 | −1.560 | −4.169 | 3.168 | 22.309 | 12.742 | 68.909 | 139.796 | 340.303 | −10.600 | −21.884 | 29.616 | 2.075 | 16.485 | 7.192 |
| proportions of population participating in private pensions | ||||||||||||||
| age 18–29 | 0.004 | 0.014 | −0.006 | −0.004 | −0.159 | −0.112 | −0.053 | −0.002 | 0.015 | 0.016 | −0.158 | −0.II7 | −0.001 | −0.002 |
| age 30–54 | −0.013 | −0.012 | −0.002 | −0.010 | −0.104 | −0.197 | −0.072 | −0.039 | 0.022 | −0.002 | −0.132 | −O.278 | −0.001 | −0.003 |
| age 55–64 | −0.009 | −0.016 | −0.003 | −0.026 | −0.043 | −0.031 | −0.048 | −0.034 | 0.000 | −0.003 | −0.081 | −0.0é2 | −0.012 | 0.000 |
| equivalised consumption to leisure ratio of graduates to non-graduates – aged 55–60 | ||||||||||||||
| −0.066 | −0.015 | −0.025 | 0.127 | −0.181 | 0.123 | −0.062 | ||||||||
| proportion of population below 60% of median income (%) | ||||||||||||||
| all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | |
| BHC | −1 | −2 | 1 | −1 | −2 | −4 | −2 | −4 | 0 | 1 | −2 | −3 | −2 | −1 |
| AHC | 0 | −1 | 0 | −1 | −1 | −2 | −1 | −2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | −2 | −1 | 1 |
Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data.
Notes: All simulations based on the calibrated model parameters, except where explicitly indicated.
‘high alpha’ simulation increases calibrated values of alpha by 20 percent.
‘no retirement effect’ simulation suppresses wage penalties of pension take-up (from 55).
‘low delta’ simulation reduce exponential discount factors by 3 percentage points.
‘no bequest’ simulation omits warm glow bequest motive.
‘low epsilon’ simulation reduces intratemporal elasticity by half.
‘high gamma’ simulation assumes: gamma = 2.0, delta(single) = 0.95, delta(couple) = 0.89, alpha reduced by 12%, zeta (single) = 3300000, zeta (couple) = 2650000.
‘high rents’ simulation increases all simulated rental charges by 50%.
