
Parameterising a detailed dynamic programming model of savings and labour supply using cross-sectional data
Tables
Calibrated model parameters adjusted to match behaviour reported for the British population cross-section in 2011.
singles | couples | |
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relative risk aversion, γ | 1.55 | 1.55 |
intratemporal elasticity, ε | 0.6 | 0.6 |
utility price of leisure, α | 2.2 | 1.034 |
d1scount factor, δ | 0.97 | 0.93 |
bequest mot1ve, ζ | 30000 | 10000 |
factor effects of pens1on take-up | ||
at age 55 | 1 | 1 |
from age 65 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
rents | lower | upper |
shared | 63.89 | 63.89 |
1 bedroom (from spa) | 55.00 | 100.00 |
1 bedroom (pre spa) | 101.48 | 106.82 |
2 bedrooms | 69.25 | 132.54 |
3 bedrooms | 81.82 | 156.59 |
4 bedrooms | 107.12 | 205.01 |
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Note: ‘spa’ refers to rents from ‘state pens1on age’.
Effects of model parameters on simulated moments considered for calibration.
high alpha | no retirement effects | low delta | no bequest | low epsilon | high gamma | high rents | ||||||||
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singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | singles | couples | |
proportions of population not employed | ||||||||||||||
age 18–29 | 0.005 | 0.003 | 0.000 | −0.001 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.005 | −0.003 | 0.001 | 0.001 | −0.002 | 0.000 | −0.001 |
age 30–54 | 0.018 | 0.037 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.037 | 0.076 | 0.090 | 0.096 | −0.015 | −0.006 | 0.035 | −0.004 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
age 55–74 | 0.024 | 0.028 | −0.098 | −0.117 | 0.004 | 0.026 | 0.159 | 0.141 | −0.038 | −0.023 | 0.052 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
geometric mean consumption (£2011 per week) | ||||||||||||||
age 18–29 | −2.871 | −7.022 | 0.228 | 0.741 | 10.279 | 36.642 | 4.593 | 15.421 | −4.252 | −2.864 | 9.681 | 8.327 | 8.155 | 11.605 |
age 30–54 | −2.754 | −12.967 | 1.248 | 8.072 | 13.229 | 68.993 | 25.536 | 92.553 | −9.079 | −34.765 | 19.582 | 21.433 | 30.011 | 14.241 |
age 55–74 | −1.560 | −4.169 | 3.168 | 22.309 | 12.742 | 68.909 | 139.796 | 340.303 | −10.600 | −21.884 | 29.616 | 2.075 | 16.485 | 7.192 |
proportions of population participating in private pensions | ||||||||||||||
age 18–29 | 0.004 | 0.014 | −0.006 | −0.004 | −0.159 | −0.112 | −0.053 | −0.002 | 0.015 | 0.016 | −0.158 | −0.II7 | −0.001 | −0.002 |
age 30–54 | −0.013 | −0.012 | −0.002 | −0.010 | −0.104 | −0.197 | −0.072 | −0.039 | 0.022 | −0.002 | −0.132 | −O.278 | −0.001 | −0.003 |
age 55–64 | −0.009 | −0.016 | −0.003 | −0.026 | −0.043 | −0.031 | −0.048 | −0.034 | 0.000 | −0.003 | −0.081 | −0.0é2 | −0.012 | 0.000 |
equivalised consumption to leisure ratio of graduates to non-graduates – aged 55–60 | ||||||||||||||
−0.066 | −0.015 | −0.025 | 0.127 | −0.181 | 0.123 | −0.062 | ||||||||
proportion of population below 60% of median income (%) | ||||||||||||||
all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | all | retirees | |
BHC | −1 | −2 | 1 | −1 | −2 | −4 | −2 | −4 | 0 | 1 | −2 | −3 | −2 | −1 |
AHC | 0 | −1 | 0 | −1 | −1 | −2 | −1 | −2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | −2 | −1 | 1 |
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Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data.
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Notes: All simulations based on the calibrated model parameters, except where explicitly indicated.
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‘high alpha’ simulation increases calibrated values of alpha by 20 percent.
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‘no retirement effect’ simulation suppresses wage penalties of pension take-up (from 55).
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‘low delta’ simulation reduce exponential discount factors by 3 percentage points.
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‘no bequest’ simulation omits warm glow bequest motive.
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‘low epsilon’ simulation reduces intratemporal elasticity by half.
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‘high gamma’ simulation assumes: gamma = 2.0, delta(single) = 0.95, delta(couple) = 0.89, alpha reduced by 12%, zeta (single) = 3300000, zeta (couple) = 2650000.
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‘high rents’ simulation increases all simulated rental charges by 50%.