Taxes and benefits

Research articles · Aug 31, 2017

A tax-benefit model for Austria (AUTAX): Work incentives and distributional effects of the 2016 tax reform

Michael Christl, Monika Köppl-Turyna, Dénes Kucsera

Independent Researcher, Austria

Volume 10(2) Summer 2017

Cite as: M. Christl, M. Köppl-Turyna, D. Kucsera; 2017; A tax-benefit model for Austria (AUTAX): Work incentives and distributional effects of the 2016 tax reform; International Journal of Microsimulation; 10(2); 144–176. doi: 10.34196/ijm.00160

Abstract

This study introduces a tax-benefit model based on administrative data for Austria (AUTAX) that can be used for the ex ante and ex post evaluation of reforms of personal income taxation and social benefits. We analyze the effects of the 2016 Austrian tax reform ex ante and concentrate on the effects on the distribution of net income and on work incentives. Our results show that the changes to the tax brackets have slightly increased inequality, and the middle- and high-income earners profited most. This effect has been significantly lowered by an increase in the negative income tax for low-income earners. By calculating average effective tax rates (AETRs) as well as marginal effective tax rates (METRs) along the whole income distribution in our model, we discuss changes on work incentives on the extensive but also on the intensive margin. We show that the 2016 tax reform positively affected the work incentives on the extensive and the intensive margin for higher income groups. The additional change in the negative income tax had only an impact on the extensive margin of low-income earners. These low-income earners are usually part-time workers, therefore giving a higher incentive to work part-time but no additional incentive to increase working hours. We show that a decrease in social security contributions instead of an increase in the negative income tax for low-income earners would lead to an increase in both the extensive and the intensive margin.

This article contains 7 figures and 23 tables.

Figures

Figure 1. Distributions of the realized and the simulated values for net wage income.
Figure 2. Annual net income increase of the 2016 tax reform.
Figure 3. Distribution of net wage income before and after the 2016 tax reform.
Figure 4. 2016 tax reform – Incentives on the extensive margin (AETR) and intensive margin (METR).
Figure 5. Policy options – Incentives for low wage incomes on the extensive (AETR) and intensive margin (METR).
Figure 6. Policy options – Incentives for middle wage incomes on the extensive (AETR) and intensive margin (METR).
Figure A1. Tax rates in different tax reforms.

Tables

Table 1. The tax system in 2015.
(a) Recurrent wage income tax rates.
Tax base(EUR) Tax rate
0 – 11,000 0%
11,000 – 25,000 36.5%
25,000 – 60,000 42.21%
> 60,000 50%
(b) Tax rates for special payments.
Tax base(EUR) Tax rate
0 – 620 0%
620 – 25,000 6%
25,000 – 50,000 27%
50,000 – 83,333 35.75%
> 83,333 50%

Source: Schratzenstaller (2009).

Table 2. Tax rates for recurrent wage in 2016.
Tax base (EUR) Tax rate
0 – 11,000 0%
11,000 – 18,000 0%
18,000 – 31,000 35%
31,000 – 60,000 42%
60,000 – 90,000 48%
90,000 – 1,000,000 50%
> 1,000,000 55%

Source: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance (2015).

Table 3. Lump-sum allowances and tax credits.
Old system New system
(EUR)
Tax credits:
employee tax credit 54 -
deductible amount for travel expenses 291 400
pensioner tax credit 400 400
Lump-sum allowances:
advertising expense lump-sum 132 132
extra charge lump-sum 60 60

Source: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance (2015).

Table 4. Summary statistics (annual data).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
(EUR)
Gross wage 26,512.47 28,273.13 65,535
Special payments (paragraph 67 (1–2) of the ESt)a 3,437–61 3,284.93 65,535
Social security and other contributions 3,411.15 3,415.68 65,535
Other wage income (paragraph 67 (3–8) of the ESt)b 375.38 4,722.25 65,535
Tax base 18,982.57 21,216.19 65,535
Total wage tax 4,036.57 9034.34 65,535

The income tax law (“Einkommensteuergesetz 1988”, short ESt).

E.g. severance indemnities, dismissal wages etc.

Table 5. The simulation model.
Gross wage income
Recurrent wage income special payments (13. and 14. payment)
+ additional wage (except 13. and 14.)
- social security contributions on recurrent income (see Table A.1)
- lump-sum commuter allowance - social security contributions on special payments
- other job-related allowances
- non-job-related allowances
= taxable recurrent income (tax base) = taxable special payments (tax base)
- income tax (see Table 2) - income tax
+ tax credits on special payments (see Table 1b)
= net wage income (recurrent wage income) = net wage income (special payments)
Table 6. Comparison of annual gross wage incomes: wage tax statistics 2014 and EU-SILC 2015.
Percentile Wage tax EU-SILC Difference
(EUR)
10 4,463 2,860 −35.9%
20 10,743 8,061 −25.0%
30 16,943 14,938 −11.8%
40 22,420 20,774 −7.3%
50 27,714 26,612 −4.0%
60 32,704 31,903 −2.4%
70 38,367 38,265 −0.3%
80 46,483 45,809 −1.4%
90 61,317 59,943 −2.2%
mean 32,208 30,858 −4.2%

Source: Statistik Austria (2016)

Table 7. Monthly ceilings for social security contributions, 2016.
Old system New system
(EUR)
Social security income cap 4,750 4,860
Social security income threshold 416 416
Table 8. Summary statistics – simulated values (annual).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
(EUR)
Wage tax 4,036.6 9,034.3 65,535
Wag tax (sim) 4,025.2 9,233.0 65,535
Net wage income 19,064.8 17,442.6 65,535
Net wage income (sim) 18,928.1 17,249.5 65,535
Table 9. Correlation realized values and simulated values.
Wage tax Net income
Apprentices 0.8508 0.9969
Blue-collar workers 0.9742 0.9979
White-collar workers 0.9931 0.9976
Civil servants 0.9905 0.9961
Public-contract staff 0.9853 0.9956
Civil-servant pensioners 0.9918 0.9972
Pensioners 0.9897 0.9971
Individuals with care allowance 1.0000 1.0000
Other individuals 0.9873 0.9975
Total 0.9922 0.9977
Table 10. Inequality measures.
Inequality measure Net income Simulated net income
Gini coefficient 0.40911 0.40706
Theil index (GE(a), a = 1) 0.31261 0.31107
Atkinson inequality measures (eps = 1) 0.35335 0.35734
Table 11. Changes in tax and social security revenues in 2016.
Old system New system
(MEUR)
Total wage tax revenues 27,644 23,451
Net tax revenues −4,193
Social security contributions 23,912 24,039
Net social security contributions 127
Table 12. Average annual net income by social groups.
Old system New system
(EUR)
Difference
Women 14,504 14,920 416 (2.87%)
Men 24,107 24,942 836 (3–47%)
Pensioners 16,346 16,835 490 (2.99%)
Employees 20,673 21,362 689 (3.33%)
Female employees 16,511 17,021 510 (3.09%)
Male employees 24,363 25,211 848 (3.48%)
Total 19,179 19,799 620 (3.23%)
Table 13. Average annual net income by social status.
Old system New system
(EUR)
Difference
Apprentices 7,255 7,627 372 (5.12%)
Blue-collar workers 14,616 15,075 459 (3.14%)
White-collar workers 25,112 25,940 828 (3.30%)
Civil servant 35,732 37,124 1,393 (3.90%)
Public contract staff 23,444 24,266 823 (3.51%)
Civil servant pensioner 29,850 31,058 1,208 (4.05%)
Pensioner 15,285 15,709 424 (2.77%)
Other individuals 8,927 9,145 218 (2.45%)
Total 19,179 19,799 620 (3.23%)
Table 14. Average annual net income by age.
Old system New system
(EUR)
Difference
16 to 25 years 10,054 10,351 297 (2.96%)
26 to 35 years 18,260 18,884 624 (3.42%)
36 to 45 years 22,306 23,056 749 (3.36%)
46 to 55 years 25,133 25,972 838 (3.34%)
56 to 65 years 22,313 23,005 692 (3.10%)
66+ years 16,682 17,197 515 (3.09%)
Total 19,179 19,799 620 (3.23%)
Table 15. Inequality measures for 2016.
Inequality measures Old system New system
Gini coefficient 0.40606 0.41005
Theil index (GE(a), a = 1) 0.30688 0.31050
Atkinson inequality measures (ε = 1) 0.45917 0.46408
Table 16. Annual net wage income by deciles.
Old system New system
(EUR)
Difference
1st decile 735 735 0 (0.00%)
2nd decile 3,905 3,912 7 (0.18%)
3rd decile 8,704 8,730 26 (0.30%)
4th decile 12,684 12,710 26 (0.20%)
5th decile 16,081 16,468 387 (2.40%)
6th decile 19,177 19,942 765 (3.99%)
7th decile 22,303 23,185 882 (3.95%)
8th decile 25,841 26,902 1,061 (4.11%)
9th decile 30,954 32,337 1,383 (4.47%)
10th decile 51,400 53,066 1,667 (3.24%)
Table 17. Theil decomposition by tax status (taxpayer or not).
Old system New system
Total 0.3069 0.3105
Within 0.1398 0.1377
Between 0.1671 0.1728
Table 18. Theil decomposition by social status, working time, age groups and gender.
(a) by social status (b) by working time
Old system New system Old system New system
Total 0.3069 0.3105 0.3069 0.3105
Within 0.2521 0.2551 0.2526 0.2548
Between 0.0547 0.0554 0.0543 0.0557
(c) by age groups (d) by gender
Old system New system Old system New system
Total 0.3069 0.3105 0.3069 0.3105
Within 0.2718 0.2752 0.2872 0.2903
Between 0.0351 0.0353 0.0197 0.0202

Notes: Social status categories listed in Table 13. Working time: part time vs. full time. Age groups listed in Table 14.

Table 19. Costs of the policy proposals.
Old system New system Proposals
SSC1 SSC2
(MEUR)
Wage tax revenue 23,451 24,006 23,830
SSC revenue 24,039 22,389 22,883
Additional wage tax revenue 556 379
Loss in SSC −1,649 −1,155
Total costs −370 −1,094 −776
Table 20. Impact of policy options on wage income deciles.
Old system New system 400 EUR NIT Proposals
SSC1 SSC2
(EUR)
1st decile 780 +16 (2.07%) +7 (0.92%) +8 (0.97%)
2nd decile 3,980 +196 (4.92%) +51 (1.28%) +52 (1.32%)
3rd dec1le 8,771 +243 (2.78%) +122 (1.40%) +126 (1.43%)
4th dec1le 12,715 +164 (1.29%) +162 (1.27%) +167 (1.31%)
5th dec1le 16,081 +391 (2.43%) +529 (3.29%) +535 (3.33%)
6th dec1le 19,177 +765 (3.99%) +925 (4.82%) +932 (4.86%)
7th dec1le 22,303 +882 (3.95%) +1,066 (4.78%) +1,075 (4.82%)
8th dec1le 25,841 +1,061 (4.11%) +1,287 (4.98%) +1,297 (5.02%)
9th dec1le 30,954 +1,383 (4.47%) +1,647 (5.32%) +1,590 (5.14%)
10th dec1le 51,400 +1,668 (3.24%) +2,075 (4.04%) +1,672 (3.25%)
Table 21. Inequalitymeasures and Theil decomposition of policy options.
New system 110 EUR NIT New System 400 EUR NIT Proposals
SSC1 SSC2
Gini coefficient 0.405 0.406 0.408 0.407
Theil Total 0.305 0.306 0.308 0.307
Theil Within 0.140 0.137 0.137 0.136
Theil Between 0.166 0.168 0.171 0.171
Table A1. Social security contributions.
HI PI UI add. taxes Total
2015
other individuals 3.82% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.07%
apprentices 3.95% 10.25% 3.00% - 17.20%
blue-collar workers 3.95% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.20%
white-collar workers 3.82% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.07%
civil servant 4.10% 11.80% 3.00% 1.00% 19.90%
public contract staff 3.82% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.07%
civil servant pensioner 5.10% 10.25% - - 15.35%
pensioner 4.90% 10.25% - - 15.15%
individual with care allowance 4.90% 10.25% - - 15.15%
2016
other individuals 3.87% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.12%
apprentices 1.67% 10.25% 1.20% - 13.12%
blue-collar workers 3.87% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.12%
white-collar workers 3.87% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.12%
civil servant 4.10% 11.75% 3.00% 1.00% 19.85%
public contract saff 3.87% 10.25% 3.00% 1.00% 18.12%
civil servant pensioner 5.10% 10.25% - - 15.35%
pensioner 5.10% 10.25% - - 15.35%
individual with care allowance 5.10% 10.25% - - 15.35%
Table A2. Independent 2-group Mann-Whitney U Test.
W p-value
2,152,840,096 0.4286

Note: Alternative hypothesis – true location shift is not equal to 0.