This article contains 8 tables.
Tables
| - year of birth | - age | - relationship statusu |
| - number of dependent childrenu | - age of dependent childrenu | - student statusu |
| - education statusu | - private pension wealthd | - timing of pension accessd |
| - non-pension wealthd | - wage potentialu | - immigrationu |
| - emigrationu | - survivalu |
| income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| response* | response* | |||||||||||
| none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | |
| net government revenue | benefits expenditure | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 33.5 | 39.5 | 41.7 | 16.6 | 15.7 | 17.3 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | −20.1 | −19.8 | −19.7 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2021 | 33.0 | 40.0 | 44.4 | 19.0 | 18.1 | 19.3 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.6 | −23.0 | −22.6 | −22.3 |
| (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2026 | 32.4 | 39.9 | 45.1 | 22.4 | 21.3 | 22.1 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 0.7 | −26.4 | −26.0 | −25.5 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2036 | 31.0 | 39.6 | 47.1 | 33.7 | 31.4 | 31.8 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | −37.3 | −36.9 | −36.0 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| 2046 | 36.6 | 44.0 | 54.9 | 46.8 | 42.8 | 43.9 | 2.1 | −0.3 | 1.1 | −50.2 | −49.7 | −48.6 |
| (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| income tax revenue | consumption tax revenue | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 40.9 | 46.3 | 44.9 | −0.1 | −0.9 | −1.3 | −6.5 | −6.3 | −2.7 | −3.4 | −3.1 | −1.1 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2021 | 41.2 | 46.7 | 48.7 | −1.0 | −1.6 | −1.8 | −6.7 | −6.3 | −3.6 | −3.1 | −2.9 | −1.1 |
| (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2026 | 40.9 | 46.6 | 50.1 | −1.2 | −2.0 | −2.2 | −7.0 | −6.4 | −4.2 | −2.8 | −2.7 | −1.1 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2036 | 41.0 | 46.9 | 53.3 | −1.1 | −2.8 | −2.9 | −8.0 | −7.3 | −5.3 | −2.6 | −2.7 | −1.3 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2046 | 48.8 | 53.0 | 62.6 | −0.6 | −3.9 | −3.3 | −10.0 | −9.2 | −6.6 | −2.7 | −3.0 | −1.4 |
| (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
“none” = projections omitting behavioural responses to policy incentives; “emp” = projections allowing for labour supply responses to policy incentives; “full” = projections allowing for labour and savings responses to policy incentives. Standard errors reported in parentheses. “income tax rates rise 10%” denotes counterfactual in which the marginal rates on all taxable income are increased by 10 percentage points. “retirement benefits fall 20%” denotes counterfactual in which all state retirement benefits are reduced in value by 20 percentage points.
Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data generated using 30 separate sets of random draws.
| income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| response* | response* | |||||||||||
| none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | |
| equivalent full time employees (’000) | consumption expenditure | |||||||||||
| 2016 | −1481.6 | −491.8 | −574.9 | 307.8 | 237.9 | 160.8 | −43.0 | −41.8 | −18.7 | −22.4 | −20.6 | −7.5 |
| (21.1) | (7.4) | (9.8) | (10.7) | (7.6) | (5.6) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | |
| 2021 | −1300.9 | −459.6 | −345.1 | 284.4 | 194.7 | 148.5 | −44.6 | −42.0 | −24.9 | −20.8 | −19.7 | −7.7 |
| (18.5) | (11.4) | (12.3) | (13.1) | (10.3) | (8.4) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2026 | −1198.7 | −435.1 | −218.9 | 321.6 | 183.0 | 153.0 | −46.9 | −43.1 | −29.0 | −19.1 | −18.5 | −8.0 |
| (19.4) | (16.0) | (14.4) | (14.9) | (10.6) | (9.7) | (0.3) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2036 | −1186.1 | −500.0 | −124.6 | 396.1 | 173.9 | 173.3 | −54.4 | −49.5 | −36.1 | −18.2 | −19.0 | −9.5 |
| (20.1) | (17.7) | (17.8) | (14.8) | (13.0) | (11.4) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| 2046 | −1081.9 | −614.6 | −156.1 | 430.4 | 105.6 | 176.9 | −68.3 | −62.4 | −45.7 | −19.2 | −21.5 | −10.8 |
| (20.3) | (17.5) | (14.2) | (19.2) | (12.1) | (12.1) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.2) | |
| private income | disposable income | |||||||||||
| 2016 | −33.1 | −15.2 | −17.4 | 7.9 | 5.3 | 3.5 | −70.7 | −59.1 | −61.8 | −13.8 | −14.9 | −15.8 |
| (0.7) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.1) | |
| 2021 | −34.2 | −15.3 | −13.1 | 8.0 | 6.1 | 3.0 | −71.5 | −59.4 | −61.4 | −15.7 | −16.3 | −18.3 |
| (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| 2026 | −37.0 | −16.5 | −12.6 | 11.3 | 8.1 | 3.6 | −74.0 | −60.7 | −62.7 | −16.0 | −17.6 | −20.8 |
| (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.6) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.2) | |
| 2036 | −47.7 | −23.9 | −15.1 | 18.9 | 11.3 | 4.8 | −84.3 | −68.4 | −68.7 | −20.2 | −25.0 | −29.7 |
| (0.8) | (0.8) | (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.4) | |
| 2046 | −61.7 | −40.0 | −25.0 | 27.2 | 12.3 | 6.5 | −105.1 | −90.0 | −87.5 | −25.4 | −35.5 | −40.5 |
| (1.2) | (0.9) | (0.8) | (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.5) | (1.2) | (0.9) | (0.8) | (0.6) | (0.7)(0.6) | ||
| pension wealth | non-pension wealth | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2021 | −35.8 | −36.4 | −8.6 | 45.8 | 25.4 | 17.4 | −102.1 | −48.6 | −175.9 | 41.4 | 39.2 | −37.8 |
| (2.1) | (1.4) | (1.7) | (2.4) | (1.6) | (1.4) | (2.4) | (1.4) | (1.8) | (2.3) | (1.7) | (1.5) | |
| 2026 | −69.2 | −77.0 | −9.1 | 89.5 | 50.7 | 34.4 | −206.7 | −103.7 | −326.9 | 83.5 | 72.8 | −78.4 |
| (2.9) | (1.7) | (2.4) | (3.2) | (1.6) | (1.5) | (3.1) | (2.3) | (3.1) | (2.7) | (1.6) | (1.6) | |
| 2036 | −125.8 | −142.3 | 17.6 | 201.1 | 118.8 | 78.6 | −408.3 | −220.3 | −585.5 | 150.1 | 112.6 | −170.7 |
| (3.7) | (2.6) | (3.0) | (4.0) | (2.8) | (2.5) | (6.0) | (4.0) | (4.7) | (4.6) | (3.8) | (3.2) | |
| 2046 | −161.9 | −211.0 | 56.0 | 366.1 | 210.7 | 140.2 | −646.3 | −360.4 | −863.8 | 236.4 | 142.8 | −280.4 |
| (6.9) | (5.8) | (5.4) | (8.0) | (3.4) | (3.0) | (9.4) | (6.3) | (8.1) | (5.9) | (4.5) | (4.5) | |
“none” = projections omitting behavioural responses to policy incentives; “emp” = projections allowing for labour supply responses to policy incentives; “full” = projections allowing for labour and savings responses to policy incentives. Standard errors reported in parentheses. “equivalent full-time employees” evaluated as projected change in total number of labour hours per week divided by 37. “private income” denotes income net of interest charges from all private sources. “disposable income” denotes income net of government taxes and transfers.
Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data generated using 30 separate sets of random draws.
| response | no behavioural responses | labour supply | labour supply and savings | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| qunitile | lowest | middle | highest | lowest | middle | highest | lowest | middle | highest |
| age-band | labour time per adult per week (mins) | ||||||||
| 25–44 | −14 | −22 | −16 | −2 | −7 | −12 | −2 | −6 | −3 |
| 45–54 | −7 | −38 | −29 | −1 | −10 | −15 | −1 | −4 | 3 |
| 55–64 | −3 | −21 | −22 | −1 | −4 | −11 | −1 | 0 | −3 |
| 65–74 | −1 | −13 | −15 | 0 | −3 | −5 | 0 | −3 | 1 |
| 75–84 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| consumption expenditure (£ per week) | |||||||||
| 25–44 | −2 | −22 | −54 | −2 | −20 | −52 | −1 | −11 | −32 |
| 45–54 | −1 | −23 | −87 | 0 | −19 | −83 | 0 | −16 | −58 |
| 55–64 | 0 | −14 | −80 | 0 | −9 | −73 | 0 | −11 | −57 |
| 65–74 | −1 | −11 | −72 | −1 | −5 | −64 | −1 | −8 | −57 |
| 75–84 | −1 | −9 | −63 | −2 | −4 | −53 | −1 | −6 | −59 |
| disposable income (£ per week) | |||||||||
| 25–44 | −5 | −24 | −72 | −1 | −19 | −69 | −1 | −23 | −63 |
| 45–54 | −2 | −34 | −148 | 0 | −21 | −131 | −1 | −29 | −119 |
| 55–64 | −1 | −28 | −140 | 0 | −15 | −111 | 0 | −17 | −106 |
| 65–74 | −5 | −31 | −139 | −5 | −18 | −109 | −5 | −15 | −105 |
| 75–84 | −10 | −23 | −73 | −10 | −17 | −72 | −10 | −10 | −73 |
| wealth (£ ’000s) | |||||||||
| 25–44 | −1 | −1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | −1 | 0 | −3 | −6 |
| 45–54 | −2 | −13 | −30 | 1 | −8 | −26 | −1 | −14 | −35 |
| 55–64 | −2 | −26 | −67 | 0 | −15 | −53 | −1 | −17 | −59 |
| 65–74 | −2 | −32 | −91 | −1 | −17 | −74 | −1 | −21 | −91 |
| 75–84 | −7 | −41 | −118 | −4 | −22 | −94 | −5 | −27 | −121 |
Notes: See notes for table 1. Quintiles defined with respect to disposable family income, equivalised using the revised OECD scale, discounted, and aggregated over the life-course. All standard errors not greater than 1 unit of respective statistic. All financial statistics reported in 2016 prices. “disposable income” denotes private income net of government taxes and transfers. “wealth” denotes the aggregate of all private pension and non-pension wealth. Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data generated using 30 separate sets of random draws.
| response | no behavioural responses | labour supply | labour supply and savings | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| qunitile | lowest | middle | highest | lowest | middle | highest | lowest | middle | highest |
| age-band | labour time per adult per week (mins) | ||||||||
| 25–44 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 45–54 | 0 | 6 | 9 | 0 | −1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| 55–64 | 0 | 11 | 35 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 11 |
| 65–74 | 0 | −2 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| 75–84 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| consumption expenditure (£ per week) | |||||||||
| 25–44 | −1 | −7 | −3 | −1 | −5 | −2 | −1 | −1 | −1 |
| 45–54 | −1 | −12 | −5 | −1 | −12 | −5 | −1 | −2 | −1 |
| 55–64 | −2 | −8 | −4 | −2 | −11 | −11 | −1 | −4 | −2 |
| 65–74 | −24 | −12 | 0 | −24 | −14 | −14 | −5 | −11 | −5 |
| 75–84 | −46 | −13 | 2 | −46 | −15 | −15 | −6 | −16 | −12 |
| disposable income (£ per week) | |||||||||
| 25–44 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 45–54 | 1 | 9 | 13 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 55–64 | 0 | 19 | 30 | 0 | 13 | 12 | 0 | 5 | 12 |
| 65–74 | −52 | −32 | −7 | −51 | −34 | −25 | −52 | −46 | −24 |
| 75–84 | −81 | −71 | −23 | −81 | −74 | −57 | −84 | −84 | −62 |
| wealth (£ ’000s) | |||||||||
| 25–44 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 45–54 | 2 | 19 | 18 | 2 | 14 | 12 | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| 55–64 | 2 | 34 | 46 | 2 | 27 | 25 | 1 | 10 | 14 |
| 65–74 | 0 | 45 | 86 | 0 | 36 | 39 | −4 | 9 | 24 |
| 75–84 | −14 | 27 | 77 | −14 | 17 | 26 | −39 | −21 | 4 |
Notes: See notes for table 3.
Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data generated using 30 separate sets of random draws.
| 1: Identify home-owners. |
| 2: if home owner then |
| 3: go to step 7 |
| 4: else |
| 5: go to step 18 |
| 6: end if |
| 7: Compute net housing equity. |
| 8: Identify mortgage holders. |
| 9: if mortgage holder then |
| 10: go to step 14 |
| 11: else |
| 12: go to step 16 |
| 13: end if |
| 14: Compute mortgage debt. |
| 15: Compute annual interest charge on mortgage debt. |
| 16: Compute returns to gross housing equity. |
| 17: Go to step 19. |
| 18: Compute rent paid. |
| 19: Evaluate council tax payment. |
| income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| response* | response* | |||||||||||
| none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | |
| net government revenue | benefits expenditure | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 52.4 | 45.8 | 41.8 | 17.5 | 17.9 | 17.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.6 | −19.6 | −19.6 | −19.7 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2021 | 56.5 | 50.7 | 44.4 | 19.3 | 19.8 | 19.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.6 | −22.0 | −22.1 | −22.3 |
| (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2026 | 59.4 | 53.1 | 45.2 | 21.8 | 22.4 | 22.2 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | −25.1 | −25.2 | −25.5 |
| (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2036 | 58.1 | 50.2 | 39.3 | 30.8 | 31.7 | 32.1 | 9.3 | 9.7 | 9.0 | −35.4 | −35.5 | −36.2 |
| (0.8) | (0.8) | (0.6) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| 2046 | 81.2 | 70.1 | 55.4 | 42.0 | 43.4 | 44.3 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.8 | −47.6 | −47.7 | −48.8 |
| (0.9) | (0.8) | (0.7) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.3) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| income tax revenue | consumption tax revenue | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 52.3 | 46.3 | 45.1 | −2.1 | −1.7 | −1.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | −2.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | −1.1 |
| (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2021 | 58.0 | 52.9 | 48.7 | −2.5 | −2.2 | −1.9 | −1.1 | −1.3 | −3.6 | −0.1 | −0.1 | −1.1 |
| (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2026 | 61.8 | 56.3 | 50.1 | −3.0 | −2.5 | −2.2 | −1.8 | −2.2 | −4.2 | −0.3 | −0.3 | −1.1 |
| (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2036 | 70.1 | 63.2 | 53.7 | −4.0 | −3.3 | −2.8 | −2.7 | −3.3 | −5.4 | −0.6 | −0.5 | −1.3 |
| (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.5) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2046 | 85.7 | 75.7 | 62.5 | −4.8 | −3.6 | −3.1 | −2.9 | −3.8 | −6.4 | −0.8 | −0.7 | −1.4 |
| (1.0) | (0.8) | (0.7) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
“none” = projections omitting behavioural responses to policy incentives; “emp” = projections allowing for labour supply responses to policy incentives; “full” = projections allowing for labour and savings responses to policy incentives. Standard errors reported in parentheses. “income tax rates rise 10%” denotes counterfactual in which the marginal rates on all taxable income are increased by 10 percentage points. “retirement benefits fall 20%” denotes counterfactual in which all state retirement benefits are reduced in value by 20 percentage points.
Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data generated using 30 separate sets of random draws.
| income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | income tax rates rise 10% | retirement benefits fall 20% | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| response* | response* | |||||||||||
| none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | none | emp | full | |
| equivalent full time employees (’000) | consumption expenditure | |||||||||||
| 2016 | −0.1 | −515.3 | −573.4 | 0.0 | 90.6 | 154.8 | 0.0 | −0.1 | −18.7 | 0.0 | −0.2 | −7.4 |
| (0.0) | (9.1) | (9.6) | (0.0) | (5.1) | (6.4) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.2) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2021 | 298.1 | −137.0 | −343.0 | 10.3 | 96.4 | 141.2 | −8.2 | −9.7 | −24.8 | −1.3 | −1.3 | −7.6 |
| (6.4) | (14.1) | (13.4) | (1.2) | (7.0) | (7.3) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2026 | 506.5 | 82.5 | −214.9 | 14.4 | 107.5 | 148.1 | −13.0 | −15.4 | −29.0 | −2.5 | −2.3 | −8.0 |
| (10.6) | (13.1) | (12.3) | (1.8) | (6.9) | (7.1) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2036 | 825.9 | 351.6 | −106.3 | 11.3 | 133.2 | 171.6 | −18.9 | −23.2 | −36.9 | −4.8 | −4.4 | −9.2 |
| (13.9) | (16.3) | (15.0) | (1.5) | (6.7) | (7.9) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.3) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| 2046 | 940.6 | 433.1 | −147.6 | 10.7 | 167.0 | 185.2 | −20.7 | −27.2 | −44.4 | −7.1 | −6.1 | −10.4 |
| (14.1) | (17.2) | (15.8) | (0.8) | (9.4) | (12.3) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.2) | |
| private income | disposable income | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 0.0 | −15.1 | −17.1 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 3.2 | −52.3 | −59.8 | −61.8 | −17.5 | −16.6 | −16.0 |
| (0.0) | (0.4) | (0.4) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.5) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.2) | |
| 2021 | 7.2 | −6.3 | −12.8 | −1.1 | 0.3 | 2.8 | −50.9 | −57.9 | −61.2 | −20.7 | −19.8 | −18.5 |
| (0.4) | (0.6) | (0.6) | (0.0) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.6) | (0.6) | (0.6) | (0.2) | (0.2) | (0.3) | |
| 2026 | 12.3 | −3.0 | −12.3 | −2.2 | −0.2 | 3.3 | −50.0 | −58.2 | −62.5 | −24.3 | −23.1 | −20.9 |
| (0.6) | (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.0) | (0.2) | (0.3) | (0.5) | (0.7) | (0.9) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.3) | |
| 2036 | 22.7 | 1.7 | −14.2 | −4.5 | −1.0 | 4.8 | −40.4 | −52.5 | −60.2 | −36.0 | −33.5 | −29.8 |
| (0.9) | (1.1) | (0.8) | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.3) | (0.7) | (0.8) | (0.8) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.4) | |
| 2046 | 30.4 | −0.2 | −23.4 | −7.1 | −1.1 | 6.4 | −56.2 | −74.5 | −85.9 | −50.0 | −45.7 | −40.6 |
| (1.2) | (1.1) | (1.1) | (0.1) | (0.3) | (0.5) | (1.6) | (1.5) | (1.7) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.6) | |
| pension wealth | non-pension wealth | |||||||||||
| 2016 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| 2021 | 1.7 | −21.6 | −7.5 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 17.4 | −233.2 | −259.3 | −175.6 | −83.7 | −81.0 | −39.3 |
| (0.7) | (1.8) | (1.9) | (0.1) | (0.8) | (1.1) | (2.4) | (3.1) | (2.5) | (0.7) | (1.0) | (1.5) | |
| 2026 | 11.1 | −33.1 | −5.4 | 0.2 | 7.0 | 32.4 | −420.3 | −473.5 | −326.7 | −171.7 | −165.0 | −79.9 |
| (1.3) | (2.1) | (2.2) | (0.2) | (1.1) | (2.2) | (4.2) | (4.3) | (3.5) | (1.7) | (1.7) | (2.2) | |
| 2036 | 53.9 | −39.0 | 27.8 | 0.4 | 13.3 | 72.4 | −681.3 | −799.3 | −566.0 | −364.4 | −344.6 | −173.4 |
| (3.3) | (4.2) | (3.6) | (0.2) | (1.2) | (2.4) | (5.3) | (6.8) | (6.2) | (3.4) | (3.8) | (4.2) | |
| 2046 | 110.5 | −44.2 | 81.4 | 0.6 | 23.8 | 136.2 | −885.0 | −1108.2 | −793.1 | −595.2 | −549.5 | −286.3 |
| (3.9) | (4.6) | (4.0) | (0.3) | (1.7) | (4.0) | (7.8) | (9.4) | (9.7) | (4.4) | (5.3) | (4.8) | |
“none” = projections omitting behavioural responses to policy incentives; “emp” = projections allowing for labour supply responses to policy incentives; “full” = projections allowing for labour and savings responses to policy incentives. Standard errors reported in parentheses. “equivalent full-time employees” evaluated as projected change in total number of labour hours per week divided by 37. “private income” denotes income net of interest charges from all private sources. “disposable income” denotes income net of government taxes and transfers.
Source: Author’s calculations on simulated data generated using 30 separate sets of random draws.
